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Abstract
We develop a resource security theory by examining the intent of acquisitions of scarce
resources by multinational firms. Results suggest that owners of firms can shape the
intent of resource acquisitions. Specifically, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to
acquire and pay more for resources for exploration rather than exploitation. This is
because SOEs’ owners – governments – are most concerned with securing their
country’s future. We contribute to the literature by suggesting that ownership influences
resource acquisitions, that resource security is of importance to multinational
enterprises, and that SOEs invest abroad to safeguard both their own and their home
countries’ future.
Keywords:
corporate entrepreneurship; international entrepreneurship; resource dependency;
resource-based view; securing natural resources; state-owned enterprises

INTRODUCTION
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are growing in presence and power in global markets
(Büge, Egeland, Kowalski, & Sztajerowska, 2013; Marcel, 2006). This is especially true
in industries related to the extraction of natural resources (Kowalski, Büge,
Sztajerowska, & Egeland, 2013; Marcel, 2006). Because natural resources are scarce,
competition in these industries is fierce. SOEs compete head-to-head with other SOEs
as well as non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). Operating as foreign-policy
instruments with financial backing from their home governments, many SOEs compete
for natural resources to enhance the long-term viability, geopolitical position, and power
of the home country (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Zif, 1983, 1981). The desire of
SOEs’ owners – governments – to reduce dependence on other firms and countries and

increase their own presence and power is apparent across natural resource sectors
(Büge et al., 2013). For instance, SOEs have a 34% share in the crude petroleum and
natural gas extraction sector and a 35% share in the coal and lignite mining sector
(Kowalski et al., 2013: 27). Although the resource dependence literature suggests that
firms with the most resources have the most power and the least dependence on others
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013), this literature is largely silent on
the intent with which firms acquire resources. That is, it does not indicate whether
resources are secured with the intent of satisfying short-term needs or as a safeguard
for the future. We attempt to address this theoretical gap by developing a resource
security theory using insights from the resource dependence literature.
By developing a resource security theory, we investigate the association between
ownership of multinational enterprises and the intent of their resource acquisitions. We
argue that multinationals acquire resources either for exploration (i.e., the initial search
and discovery of value in resources, for long term resource security) or for exploitation
(i.e., the production using resources of known value, for relatively shorter-term resource
security). Examining resource security in an exploration vs exploitation framework
allows us to assess the strategic intent of investments made abroad by SOEs and
NSOEs. Resources acquired for exploration have little or no utility toward satisfying
short-term needs. However, SOEs are more interested than NSOEs in acquiring
resources for exploration because such resources allow their owners – governments –
to secure their home country’s future (Gaille, 2010; He & Wong, 2004). SOEs can
ascribe value to these acquired resources through exploration and hold them in reserve
as a safeguard for the future. Such resource acquisitions can help increase geopolitical
position and power by lessening the SOE’s future dependence on other firms and
countries for resources (Gaille, 2010). When resources are exploited and consequently
consumed, the long-term strategic benefits, including enhanced geopolitical position
and power, are correspondingly depleted.
We use the global upstream petroleum industry as the setting for our study. This
industry is appropriate because, in the words of French industrialist and Senator, Henri
Berenger, “he who owns the oil will own the world.” This statement echoes the
sentiment that firms (and countries) with access to valuable resources, such as oil, have
the most power and least dependence on other firms (and countries) for these
resources. Yet for firms operating in this industry, gaining access to petroleum
resources is challenging for several reasons. First, competition for this non-renewable
resource is increasing as demand increases (EIA, 2012). Second, petroleum resources
are unevenly dispersed across the globe, which requires many firms to operate as
multinationals. Third, the industry is a complex web of numerous players ranging from
governments and SOEs to non-state-owned publicly traded and privately held firms.
Additionally, the petroleum industry is an appropriate setting for our study because
exploration (i.e., the search and discovery for availability of petroleum) and exploitation
(i.e., petroleum production) are the two most critical activities in this industry.

Our study offers several implications for theory. First, we highlight that owners may
influence the intent of resource acquisitions by multinationals. Governments, as owners,
typically orient firms to secure resources in a way that will ensure resource
independence and geopolitical power for the home countries and thereby provide longterm resource security. Second, we examine how multinationals pursue resource
security through the resources they acquire. Multinationals can secure resources either
to satisfy short-term needs or to secure resources as a long-term safeguard for the
future. For some multinationals, resources that secure the firm’s (or home country’s)
future are worth more than resources that can be exploited to satisfy short-term needs.
These multinationals secure resources to decrease their resource dependence (thus
ensuring their resource independence) in the future. Third, we explain why
multinationals investing abroad to acquire resources is in fact beneficial for the home
country. At the surface-level, an investment abroad by a multinational appears as an
investment lost at home. However, we suggest that while the investment outflow might
be perceived as a short-term loss for the home country, the investment abroad helps
the SOE acquire resources to secure its country’s future. The pressure on SOEs to
align their priorities with that of the home country shapes the strategic intent of SOEs
with regard to resource acquisitions.
RESOURCE SECURITY
Resource dependence theory (RDT) is traditionally used to investigate why and how
firms vie for resources from a finite resource pool. Firms with the most resources have
the most power and the least dependence on other firms, whereas firms with the least
resources have the least power and the most dependence on other firms (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). By internalizing resources, firms can increase power and reduce
dependence on other firms. Further, the resource-based view suggests that internalized
resources can help improve performance (He, Chakrabarty, & Eden, forthcoming;
Volberda, van den Bosch, Flier, & Gedajlovic, 2001). We suggest a complementary
theory – that firms are often on the quest for resource security. We suggest that firms
choose to acquire resources for long-term security (e.g., acquire resources for
exploration that can be held in reserve) or for relatively shorter-term security (e.g.,
acquire resources that can be exploited to satisfy more immediate consumption needs).
Exploration vs Exploitation of Resources
Once resources are acquired, they can be secured through exploration, or made for
consumption through exploitation. As applied to knowledge resources, Levinthal and
March (1993: 105) suggested that exploration is the “pursuit of new knowledge,” and
exploitation is the “use and development of things already known.” That is, firms can (1)
search, discover, or experiment to explore for valuable knowledge or (2) produce,
refine, and execute to exploit available knowledge (March, 1991). More recently, the
exploration vs exploitation framework has been extended to resources other than
knowledge (Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010). As shown in Table 1, the framework can
be applied to a wide variety of settings including product-based industries (Hoang &

Rothaermel, 2010; McNamara & Baden-Fuller, 2007), retail banking and insurance
(Flier, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2003; Volberda et al., 2001), investment banking and
venture funding (McNamara & BadenFuller, 2007), professional service firms
(Groysberg & Lee, 2009), and theaters (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008), among
others. In general, there is a “higher level of risk inherent in exploratory activities, which
require significant investments with uncertain payoffs,” whereas exploitation involves
payoffs from “existing or minimally modified competencies” that can happen only
“following successful exploration” (Voss et al., 2008: 147). Consistent with the broad
literature illustrated in Table 1, in this study we define exploration as the search and
discovery of value in resources, where the value of the resources was previously
undetermined and exploitation as the production using resources, where the value of
the resources has already been determined (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001).

Resource Security Theory
Our study offers a resource security theory to analyze the strategic intent that drives
resource acquisitions. Acquiring resources for exploration increases long term resource
security – with the resources serving as a safeguard so that the value can be unlocked
in the future through search and discovery. Acquiring resources for exploitation
increases short-term security – by using the resources for production and thereby
satisfying the demands of consumption.
Firms view and pursue resource security differently. On the one hand, firms strategizing
for the short-term acquire resources to satisfy short-term needs, such as consumption,
and do so through exploitation activities. On the other hand, firms strategizing for the
long-term attempt to achieve resource security by acquiring resources with the intent of
converting their resource dependence (i.e., dependence on external/foreign entities that
hold the resources) into future resource independence (by securing the resources as a
safeguard for the future).
Owners, Firms, and Resource Security
In this study, we focus on how owners influence resource acquisition intents. Owners
provide the necessary support, including capital, to facilitate a multinational firm’s
resource acquisitions. Through these acquisitions, the intent of the firm should ideally
align with the directions provided by the owners (Demsetz, 1983; Wry et al., 2013). The
owner can dictate the intent of the firm and subsequently influence how and where the
firm competes to acquire resources. Governments, via the SOEs they own, are
increasingly pursuing cross-border investment opportunities to acquire globally
dispersed resources to secure the future of their countries. SOEs, acting on behalf of
governments, therefore acquire resources as a safeguard for the future (rather than to
satisfy short-term needs or market demands). In doing so, SOEs can help reduce their
home-country’s dependence on foreign entities for these resources in the future.
NSOEs, in contrast, usually compete to boost short-term returns and wealth creation for
shareholders (Gaille, 2010; Mascarenhas, 1989). NSOEs are often more concerned
with acquiring resources that will help satisfy current market demands and thereby
provide short-term benefits to the firm and its shareholders.
HYPOTHESES: SOEs VS NSOEs
SOEs and NSOEs pursue business opportunities for differing purposes. NSOEs operate
under the logic of market capitalism and operate largely with business intent. NSOEs
often focus on short-term profitability and return on investment for non-state
shareholders (Gaille, 2010; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). In comparison, SOEs operate
under an economic logic of state capitalism in which both geopolitical intent and
business intent dictate where and how they compete (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Zif,
1981). SOEs are often concerned with “wealth re-distribution, jobs creation, general
economic development, [and] economic and energy security” (Pirog, 2007: 1). SOEs
are sensitive to political interests, public accountability, and foreign policy goals of their

home-country governments (Gaille, 2010; Mascarenhas, 1989; Ramaswamy, Li, &
Veliyath, 2002). Thus many SOEs operate to enhance the geopolitical position and
power of their home countries (Bradshaw, 2009; Bremmer, 2009). SOEs and NSOEs
also differ in efficiency considerations. SOEs are often less efficient than their NSOE
counterparts. Hence to safeguard against marginal returns and wealth depletion, SOEs
may choose to avoid activities where efficiency is critical (Bremmer, 2009; Gaille, 2010;
Lin, Cai, & Li, 1998).
Competition between SOEs and NSOEs for Resources
State ownership influences the likelihood of acquiring resources for exploration
We suggest that SOEs are more likely to acquire resources for exploration than
exploitation. SOEs must satisfy the political intents of their home country governments,
which are generally concerned with long-term viability (Katusa, 2012; Musacchio &
Flores-Macias, 2009; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). Considering that exploration
precedes exploitation (Lavie et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2008), acquiring resources for
exploration provides SOEs the flexibility to hold the resources in reserve,engage in
exploration as per their convenience, and wait to exploit the explored resources until the
demand arises (Kaplowitz, 2004). As suggested to us by the Chief Operating Officer of
a Canadian oil and gas company, “[SOEs] place more importance on strategic benefits,
in particular, security of national energy supply for the future.” SOEs are increasingly
under pressure from their home governments to acquire resources for exploration as a
safeguard for the future of their home countries. Acquiring resources for exploration
helps position the SOEs and their home countries to be less dependent on other firms
and countries in the future. This enhances the geopolitical position and power of the
home countries. Thus we suggest that the extent of state ownership increases the
likelihood of acquiring resources for exploration.
Hypothesis 1:
Multinationals with greater state ownership are more likely to acquire resources
for exploration and less likely to acquire resources for exploitation.
State ownership influences the price paid for resources for exploration
SOEs place greater value than NSOEs on acquiring resources for exploration for two
reasons. First, these resources do not require efficiency and technical competence
(which many SOEs lack and many NSOEs have expertise in) (Gaille, 2010; Zif, 1981).
Resources for exploitation may expose this technical inferiority of SOEs and threaten
the business intent of wealth maximization for these firms. Second, exploration of
resources is a way for the SOE to ensure it has access to resources that can potentially
satisfy future demand. Paying more for such resources benefits the SOE because
exploration of resources helps secure the future of the SOE’s home country in terms of
national security and geopolitical position (Klein & Robinson, 2011). As stated to us by
an industry executive in reference to investments in exploration of resources, “[SOEs]

ascribe a premium to the value … above and beyond the risked economic potential of
the investment as seen by [NSOEs].” Finally, SOEs tend to be highly funded, with
access to low-cost capital provided from the stable backing of their host governments
(Katusa, 2012). Thus access to financial capital to pay a premium for acquiring
resources for exploration is less of a concern for SOEs. This sentiment was echoed in a
statement to us by an industry executive in reference to investments in exploration of
resources: “most [SOEs] have significant ability to purchase and fund development …
They also invest for the long term and are not as concerned about current quarter profit
reporting, as public companies are.” In sum, we argue that, compared with NSOEs,
SOEs place higher value on exploration of resources and are willing to pay a premium
for the same.
Hypothesis 2:
Multinationals with greater state ownership pay higher prices for acquiring
resources for exploration and lower prices for resources for exploitation.
Moderators: Target Country’s Resource-richness and Target Country-specific
Experience
Moderators of the influence of state ownership on the likelihood of acquiring
resources for exploration
Geographic location can determine access to resources (Amburgey & Rao, 1996; Wry
et al., 2013) and subsequently the resource acquisition behaviors of multinationals. As
multinationals seek to acquire resources for exploration, they may look to regions that
are resource-rich and in which they have previous experience.
Multinationals are more likely to acquire resources for exploration when the target
country is rich in resources. Resource-rich countries have higher resource potential
(Almeida & Phene, 2004). That is, these countries have more resources that are
currently being exploited and/or can be explored. Like NSOEs, targeting resource-rich
countries provides SOEs with the opportunity to satisfy the business intent of wealth
maximization. However, unlike NSOEs, SOEs can also satisfy the geopolitical intent of
their home-country governments when targeting resource-rich countries. That is,
gaining a foothold in resource-rich countries enhances an SOE’s geopolitical position
and decreases its home government’s future dependence on foreign entities. Further,
SOEs are more likely to acquire resources for exploration when they have previous
experience in the target country. Target country-specific experience indicates an SOE’s
knowledge and familiarity with the country. An SOE is more willing to acquire resources
in countries in which it has experience because it is more familiar with the country and
has location specific knowledge about the country’s resources. This location-specific
knowledge helps the SOE to operate more effectively and make informed decisions
about exploration activities. In sum, we suggest that SOEs are more likely to acquire
resources for exploration when the target country is resource-rich and when they have
previous experience in the target country.

Hypothesis 3a:
Multinationals with greater state ownership are much more likely to acquire
resources for exploration when the target country’s resource-richness is high.
Hypothesis 3b:
Multinationals with greater state ownership are much more likely to acquire
resources for exploration when the multinational’s target country-specific
experience is high.
Moderators of the influence of state ownership on the price paid for resources for
exploration
Extending the above argument to prices paid, we suggest that SOEs pay much higher
prices for resources for exploration when the target country is resource-rich and when
the SOE has more target country-specific experience. SOEs are increasingly investing
abroad in resource-rich countries to acquire resources to protect the energy security
and geopolitical position of their home governments. Paying more for resources for
exploration in resource-rich countries is worthwhile for at least two reasons. First, SOEs
have the option to develop and exploit the resources in the future at any time of their
choosing – perhaps when their home country needs the resources the most. Second,
SOEs have the option of selling the yet-to-be-exploited resources to other firms that are
eager to exploit the resources. The potential to exploit resources in the future or sell the
resources to others ensures the long-term viability of the SOE. Similarly, an SOE places
more value on resources in countries in which it has more experience. In these
locations, the SOE has more familiarity with the country and location-specific knowledge
about the country’s resources. This familiarity further enhances the SOE’s ability to
satisfy political intent of enhanced geopolitical position and power and business intent of
wealth maximization. In sum, we suggest that SOEs pay much higher prices for
resources for exploration both when the target country is resource-rich and when the
firm’s target country-specific experience is high.
Hypothesis 4a:
Multinationals with greater state ownership pay much higher prices for resources
for exploration when the target country’s resource richness is high.
Hypothesis 4b:
Multinationals with greater state ownership pay much higher prices for resources
for exploration when the target country-specific experience of the multinationals
is high.
METHODS
While SOEs are present in a wide variety of industries such as service, manufacturing,
and utility industries, a critical focus area of governments and their SOEs has been on

the natural resource-based industries (Büge et al., 2013). Natural resource based
industries include metallic minerals (e.g., iron, copper, bauxite, etc.), non-metallic
minerals (limestone, quartz, gemstones, etc.), and hydrocarbons (e.g., methane, coal,
and petroleum). Among the natural resource-based industries, the petroleum (i.e., oil
and gas) industry has gained special attention of governments because the world
economy has become heavily dependent on petroleum (Karev, 2013). Securing
petroleum resources across the world to safeguard the country’s future has become a
national priority for many countries (Gaille, 2010; Karev, 2013). The petroleum industry
has three sectors: upstream, midstream, and downstream. The setting for this study is
the upstream sector of the petroleum industry. This is an appropriate setting because
SOEs and NSOEs in this sector actively attempt to acquire resources around the world
for exploration and exploitation (Tordo, Tracy, & Arfaa, 2011).
Data and Procedure
Our data consist of market-based transactions for petroleum resource acquisitions by
multinationals (both SOEs and NSOEs) across the world. We compiled the data from
various sources such as company websites, annual reports, trade journals, finance
portals, industry lists, trade publications, and petroleum industry sources that track
petroleum transactions (DP, 2012; PLS, 2012). We focused on the period 2005 to 2012.
Though thousands of transactions were announced during this period, a constraint we
faced is that limited or no data were publicly available for a large majority of the
transactions. Thus we put substantial efforts into identifying transactions with as much
non-missing data as possible for the variables of interest. Further, while thousands of
transactions were announced during the period 2005 to 2012, only a fraction were
cross-border (i.e., transactions where the resource was located in a country that was
foreign to either the acquirer firm, seller firm, or both firms). As such, we focused our
data collection efforts on multinationals involved in such transactions. We were able to
collect data on 404 transactions involving SOEs and NSOEs acquiring petroleum
resources across the world. Some of our regressions (in the results section) use this
entire sample size of 404 market-based acquisition transactions while other regressions
use slightly reduced sample sizes because of missing data for some of the variables of
interest.
Table 2 provides the sample characteristics. The transaction value, or the purchase
price, is USD 787 million on average. The sample consisted of transactions for
acquiring resources for exploitation(34.9%) and exploration (28.7%). Fifty-eight percent
of the transactions had a SOE as an acquirer or seller of resources. We highlight the
involvement of SOEs in our sample in Figure 1, which illustrates a few examples from
our sample (of national governments, their SOEs, and their target countries).

Measures of Dependent Variables
Exploration and exploitation are so essential in the petroleum industry that they are a
part of the industry’s standard nomenclature (Gaille, 2010; PLS, 2012; SPE, 2007,
2012). Our binary measures for firms acquiring resources for exploration vs exploitation
and our continuous measures for the prices paid are described below. The data for
these dependent variables are from one of the years between 2005 and 2012
(whenever the event, i.e., transaction announcement, occurred).

Acquiring resources for exploration
This dependent variable is measured as a binary variable. It has a value of 1 if the
transaction type clearly indicates resources for exploration. These are transactions of
undeveloped resources, or resources that are “expected to be recovered through future
investments” (SPE, 2007: 27). These transactions of undeveloped resources are
classified as exploration of resources for the first time (new exploration awards),
resources that have been awarded but no exploration activity has occurred (exploration
blocks previously awarded), or exploration of petroleum resources in areas where
discoveries have previously been made but have not been developed and put into
production (discoveries not yet under development) (PLS, 2012). It has a value of 0 for
all other transaction types, such as those indicating exploitation or those that do not
clearly fall in the category of either exploration or exploitation (e.g., mix of various asset
types, corporate M&A, or fields under development).
When a firm acquires petroleum resources for exploration, it cannot immediately start
generating returns from the resources. This is because the resources (i.e., fields)
cannot be exploited (production-related activities) until they have initially been explored
and successfully developed into producible fields. Hence the main benefit of acquiring
resources for exploration is that it provides the firm with a long-term reserve of
unexploited resources that can be used in the future (SPE, 2007).

Price paid for acquiring resources for exploration
We use two proxies to measure the price paid to acquire resources for exploration: (i)
value of undeveloped acres purchased, and (ii) deal value per unit acre for exploration
(PLS, 2012; SPE, 2012).
First, the value of undeveloped acres purchased is measured as the dollar value of the
undeveloped portion of the acreage acquired by the multinational. The net undeveloped
acreage, in acres, refers to the lease acreage on which wells have not been completed
to a point of testing or allowing production (SPE, 2012). The dollar value of this acreage
provides the measure of the price paid to acquire resources for exploration (Crawford,
1970).
Second, the price per unit acre for exploration is measured as the total purchase price
(amount in $) divided by the portion of acreage available for exploration. This measure
incorporates how much was paid in total for the deal (in $) as the numerator, divided by
the amount of area (in acres) that can be used for exploration. The ratio, in dollars per
acre, is used as another measure of the price paid to acquire resources for exploration
(PLS, 2012).
Acquiring resources for exploitation
This dependent variable is measured as a binary variable. It has a value of 1 if the
transaction type clearly indicates resources for exploitation. These are transactions of
developed resources, or resources of “expected quantities to be recovered from existing
wells and facilities” (SPE, 2007: 27). These transactions of developed resources are
classified as operation of fields in geographic areas where petroleum resources have
been found and are currently in production (producing fields), or in geographic areas
that were once producing but operation of these fields has previously ceased and has
since been revitalized (redevelopment fields) (PLS, 2012). It has a value of 0 for all
other transaction types, such as those indicating exploration or those that do not clearly
fall in the category of either exploration of exploitation. Once a firm acquires petroleum
resources for exploitation, it can generate returns from the resources through production
(Gaille, 2010; He & Wong, 2004).
Price paid for acquiring resources for exploitation
We use two proxies to measure the price paid to acquire resources for exploitation: (i)
transaction premium for proved and probable reserves, and (ii) transaction value per
unit of production (PLS, 2012; SPE, 2012).
First, the premium paid for proved and probable reserves is measured as a ratio minus
the average of that ratio for all transactions made that year. Specifically, it is the
[purchase price in $ / sum of proved and probable reserves in barrels of oil equivalent]
for the focal transaction minus the average of the [purchase price in $ / sum of proved
and probable reserves in barrels of oil equivalent] for all petroleum transactions that
were made that year around the world by various parties. This difference reflects the

extent to which the firm paid a premium (difference is a positive value) or a discount
(difference is a negative value). The denominator of the ratio, proved and probable
reserves, is calculated as the net reserves expected to accrue to the firm after the host
government takes its share under a production sharing agreement/contract (PLS, 2012).
Technically, “proved reserves are those quantities of petroleum, which by analysis of
geoscience and engineering data, can be estimated with reasonable certainty to be
commercially recoverable, from a given date forward, from known reservoirs and under
defined economic conditions, operating methods, and government regulations” (SPE,
2007: 28).
Second, the price per unit of production is measured as the purchase price (amount in
$) divided by the daily production (in barrels of oil equivalent) from the purchased asset.
This measure incorporates how much was paid in total (in $) as the numerator, divided
by the volume of actual crude petroleum (oil and natural gas) extraction each day. The
denominator refers to the net production expected to accrue to the firm after the host
government takes its share under a production sharing agreement (PLS, 2012).
Measures of Independent Variables
We lag the independent variables behind the dependent variables to indicate the
longitudinal direction of the influence being tested. While the data for the dependent
variables are from one of the years between 2005 and 2012, the corresponding data for
independent variables “extent of state ownership” and “target country’s resourcerichness” are from the years 2002 to 2009. Results of regressions are similar when
alternative lag periods (such as one, 2, or 4 years) are used. The data for independent
variables “firm’s target country-specific experience” and “firm’s ratio of exploration to
exploitation experience” are from the 5 years preceding the date of the focal purchase
transaction.
Extent of state ownership
This is measured as the percentage of equity shares of the multinational that is owned
by the national government of the multinational’s home country.
Target country’s resource-richness
This is measured, in dollars, as the ratio of the value of the stock of energy resources to
the remaining reserve lifetime (World Bank, 2011). It is equivalent to the product of unit
resource rents and the physical quantities of energy extraction in the country.
Firm’s target country-specific experience
A multinational’s target country-specific experience is measured in terms of frequency of
past involvement in the target country. That is, the number of purchase transactions in
the target country during the 5 years preceding the date of the focal transaction.
Measures of Control Variables

Dummy variables for year of transaction
Dummy variables are created to control for the year in which the transaction was
announced. The 2005 to 2012 period was a turbulent time, with earlier years being
mostly favorable and later years being mostly unfavorable for the global economy.
Dummy variables for region where resource is located
Dummy variables are created to control for ten global regions (listed in Table 2) where
the resource being acquired is located. This helps control for numerous extraneous
factors (e.g., political and civic unrest, infrastructure, geological features, extraction
difficulties, etc.) that can contribute to differences across locations.
Hydrocarbon source
This is a binary variable on whether the hydrocarbon is conventional (e.g., oil, gas, and
coal) or unconventional (e.g., tight sands, coalbed, and shale, which are more difficult to
extract and require more technological capabilities) (SPE, 2012).
Foreign direct investment
This is measured as ratio of the foreign direct investment inflow to gross domestic
product of the target country (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2013a; World Bank, 2011). Inflow of
FDI is both an indication of, and a contributor to, better investment climates, and hence
we control for the same.
RESULTS
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for our study. Logistic
regressions are used to test hypotheses where the dependent variables are binary.
These are Hypotheses 1, 3a, and 3b. OLS regressions are used to test the hypotheses
where the measures of the dependent variables are continuous. These are Hypotheses
2, 4a, and 4b. The regressions results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Competition between SOEs and NSOEs for Resources
Likelihood of acquiring resources for exploration vs exploitation
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the extent of state ownership has a significantly positive
influence on the probability of a multinational deciding to acquire resources for
exploration (β = 0.24 with p<0.01 in model A2 of Table 4). Additionally, the extent of
state ownership has a significantly negative influence on the probability of a
multinational deciding to acquire resources for exploitation (β = −0.26 with p<0.001 in
model B2 of Table 4). The findings suggest that, when comparing SOEs with NSOEs,
SOEs are more likely to acquire resources for exploration, and NSOEs are more likely
to acquire resources for exploitation.

Price paid by SOEs vs NSOEs for resources for exploration vs exploitation
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the extent of state ownership has a significantly positive
influence on the price paid to acquire resources for exploration (β = 0.16 with p<0.01 in
model C2 and β = 0.18 with p<0.001 in model D2 of Table 5). Additionally, the extent of
state ownership has a significantly negative influence on the price paid to acquire
resources for exploitation (β = −0.23 with p<0.001 in model E2 and β = −0.16 with
p<0.01 in model F2 of Table 5). The findings suggest that, when comparing SOEs with
NSOEs, SOEs tend to pay higher prices than NSOEs to acquire resources for
exploration, and NSOEs tend to pay higher prices than SOEs to acquire resources for
exploitation.
Moderators of the influence of state ownership on the likelihood of acquiring
resources for exploration
Consistent with Hypotheses 3a and 3b, the influence of state ownership on the
probability of acquiring resources for exploration is moderated by the target country’s
resource-richness (β = 0.14 with p = 0.06 in model A3 of Table 4) and the firm’s target
country-specific experience (β = 0.20 with p<0.05 in model A4 of Table 4). As shown in
the interaction plots in Figure 2, the influence of state ownership on the probability of
acquiring resources for exploration is more strongly positive when the target country’s

resource-richness and the firm’s target country-specific experience are high. That is,
when these moderators are high, SOEs are much more likely than NSOEs to acquire
resources for exploration.

Moderators of the influence of state ownership on the price paid for resources for
exploration
Consistent with Hypotheses 4a and 4b, the influence of the state ownership on the price
paid to acquire resources for exploration is moderated by the target country’s resourcerichness (β =0.28 with p<0.001 in model C3 and β =0.23 with p<0.001 in model D3 of
Table 5) and the firm’s target country specific experience (β =0.18 with p <0.001 in
model C4 and β= 0.21 with p<0.001 in model D4 of Table 5). As shown in the
interaction plots in Figure 2, the influence of state ownership on the price paid to acquire
resources for exploration is more strongly positive when the target country’s resourcerichness and the firm’s target country-specific experience are high. That is, when these
moderator variables are high, SOEs pay much higher prices than NSOEs to acquire
resources for exploration.
Post-hoc Analysis: Heterogeneity among SOEs
In previous sections, we argued that SOEs are more likely than NSOEs to acquire
resources for exploration and pay higher prices for these resources. This argument
should not be incorrectly interpreted to imply somehow that SOEs never acquire
resources for exploitation. In fact, there is heterogeneity (i.e., variance) among SOEs in
terms of the resources they choose to acquire, and we carried out post-hoc analysis to
illustrate the same. We calculated a variable ratio of exploration to exploitation
experience of SOEs as the [(number of purchases of resources for exploration) /
(number of purchases of resources for exploitation+1)] during the 5 years preceding the

date of the focal transaction. In a subsample comprising only of SOEs, we found that
this variable has a significantly positive influence on the prices the SOEs pay to acquire
resources for exploration (β = 0.16 with p<0.05 in model G2 and β = 0.30 with p<0.001
in model H2 of Table 6) and a significantly negative influence on the prices the SOEs
pay to acquire resources for exploitation (β = −0.25 with p<0.001 in model I2 and β =
−0.23 with p<0.05 in model J2 of Table 6). The findings suggest heterogeneity among
SOEs. SOEs that participate in fewer exploration activities are possibly inexperienced in
this strategic activity, possibly have stronger business intent, or are more inclined to
satisfy the short-term consumption demands in their home countries. Such SOEs are
more willing than other SOEs to pay higher prices for resources for exploitation. Figure
3 illustrates the characteristics of countries that have SOEs.

CONCLUSION
SOEs that invest abroad to acquire resources operate at the crucial intersection
between the political economy and international business. Many governments
encourage SOEs to acquire resources in foreign countries, not necessarily for
immediate benefits, but as a safeguard for the country’s economic and geopolitical
future. SOEs that are constrained rather than encouraged by their home-country
governments risk falling behind in the global race for scarce resources.
Contributions to Theory
Our study offers several theoretical implications. First, we provide insight into ownership
considerations. Many SOEs are actively supported by their home-country governments
to invest abroad to acquire resources. We connect the notion of differences in
ownership orientations to differences in the resources acquired. In comparison with
NSOEs, SOEs are more concerned with pursuing long-term energy and economic
security, operating as capitalist foreign-policy arms of their home-country governments,
and striving to enhance geopolitical position and power. Operating with both political
intent and business intent, SOEs are more likely to acquire resources for exploration to
decrease their future dependence on other firms in the industry and provide resource
security to their home country. For SOEs, securing the future is about securing future
resource independence. It provides SOEs with solace in knowing that they have
secured resources that, though not ready for immediate exploitation, could certainly be
developed and exploited in the future when the need arises.
Second, we examine how multinationals acquire resources to secure their future.
Traditional conceptualizations of RDT focus on the resources that firms need to be
powerful at present (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wry et al., 2013). The only mention of
future-oriented firm action is in relation to constraining behavior: “response to the
demands of one group constrains the organization in its future actions” (Pfeffer &
Nowak, 1976: 43). This study moves beyond traditional RDT arguments by suggesting
that forward-looking valuation of resources is needed. As shown in this study, some
multinationals strategize for long-term resource security. That is, they acquire resources
in which value can be determined by exploration and can be held in reserve to secure
the firm’s (or home government’s) future. For these multinationals, acquiring these
resources is worth more than acquiring resources that are exploitable at present. This is
in contrast to multinationals that strategize for short-term resource security. These
multinationals acquire resources for exploitation to satisfy short-term market demands
and to provide prompt return on investment to shareholders. Hence it is important to
recognize that multinationals may view and pursue resource security differently.
Finally, we provide insight into multinationals and the need to encourage them to invest
abroad (Crilly, 2011; Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999). When a multinational invests
abroad, this investment outflow might be perceived as a short-term loss for the home
country. However, we suggest that investments abroad help the home country in the

long-term if they are made to acquire resources to secure the country’s future. Apart
from reducing future dependence on foreign entities, multinationals also cross borders
because of political intent. SOEs operate internationally to gain access to resources in a
way that secures the home country’s future in terms of economic gains, geopolitical
position, and power.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Insights into the complexities of the petroleum industry
Traditionally, SOEs represented nationalism in their home countries and helped create
and redistribute domestic wealth among citizens. Why, then, are SOEs crossing borders
to invest and compete abroad? SOEs in the petroleum industry (also termed as National
Oil Companies, or NOCs) are attempting to secure the future for their home countries.
Within this industry, it is largely recognized that, “NOCs’ immediate priority is to secure
oil supplies” (Karev, 2013: 18). Future energy security stems from building an
international petroleum resource portfolio (Mehta, 2013). Given the complexity, and at
times instability, of the petroleum market, governments can secure their countries’
future by directing their NOCs to acquire petroleum resources in foreign countries.
These countries with NOCs feel secure in having a globally dispersed petroleum
resource portfolio that can be tapped when needed. Thus an investment made abroad
is not necessarily a loss of investment at home. An investment abroad in terms of
acquiring petroleum resources means securing control of these resources now as a
safeguard for the country’s future.
Heterogeneity in home country’s internal resource demand
The lack of sufficient resources within a country to meet the country’s internal demands
can make the country dependent on imports from foreign entities. Such countries are
net importers of resources (Karev, 2013). In order to reduce dependence on imports
from foreign entities, the governments of these countries are likely to encourage their
NOCs to invest abroad to acquire the resources. In our sample, as illustrated in Figure
3, this holds true for the following countries: China, India, Italy, South Korea, Brazil, and
Poland. Select examples of NOCs from these countries and their destinations for
acquiring resources were illustrated in Figure 1.
In contrast, there are countries that have more than enough resources to satisfy internal
demands and are therefore not dependent on imports from foreign entities. Such
countries are often net exporters of resources (Karev, 2013). With abundance of
resources at home available for export, the governments of such countries do not
necessarily need to encourage their NOCs to invest abroad to acquire more resources
(Marcel, 2006). Accordingly, we observed that numerous NOCs (such as those from
countries in the Middle East – Aramco of Saudi Arabia, KPC of Kuwait, NIOC of Iran,
North Oil Company of Iraq, etc.) do not appear in our sample. As illustrated in Figure 3,
there are at least 23 countries that are net exporters and have NOCs but their NOCs
have not invested abroad to acquire resources.

The exceptions – net exporters investing abroad to acquire even more resources
There are exceptions to the above logic. There are multiple countries that have more
than enough resources within their borders to satisfy internal demands and are net
exporters of resources. Yet these countries’ NOCs still invest abroad to acquire more
resources. As shown in Figure 3, there are at least seven countries that are net
exporters and yet their NOCs are investing abroad to acquire more resources: Norway,
Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Colombia, Russia, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
Take Russia as an example from this group. NOCs from Russia, including Gazprom
and Rosneft, are increasingly investing abroad. This is a surprising finding since Russia,
as shown in Figure 3, is a net exporter. Why are Russian NOCs making crossborder
acquisition of petroleum resources despite having plentiful resources within the
country’s borders? We believe this surprising fact highlights an interesting complexity
that is only made explicit when studying multinational NOCs. We examined publicly
available corporate documentation (press releases, presentations, and transcripts from
Q&A sessions with investors) to understand this complexity further. Consider a
transaction in which Rosneft, a Russian NOC, bought resources for exploration in the
US from ExxonMobil. An executive from Rosneft commented that the transaction lays
“the foundation for long-term growth of the Russian oil and gas industry” and that it “will
allow Rosneft to become one of the global leaders in the oil and gas industry.” Similarly,
consider a transaction in which Gazprom, a Russian NOC, acquired resources for
exploration in Iraq. An executive for Gazprom commented: “Based on our positive
experience in cooperation with the Republic of Iraq … the company had decided to
expand its presence in this country. Carrying out these projects will allow Gazprom … to
expand its presence abroad.” Since 2005, Russian NOCs have invested in resource
acquisitions in countries – such as Iraq, Libya, and Venezuela – that are of major
geopolitical interest to the world. By investing abroad to acquire more resources despite
their abundance at home, Russian NOCs are increasing their geopolitical position and
power. This increasingly international resource portfolio of Russian NOCs suggests that,
in the future, other countries might be more dependent on Russia (and Russian NOCs)
to access petroleum resources.
In the last few decades, most of these net exporting countries – Norway, United Arab
Emirates, Algeria, and Russia – have created sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) from
revenues from the export of petroleum resources. Norway’s “Government Pension
Fund” has assets of more than $800 billion, UAE’s “Abu Dhabi Investment Authority”
and other smaller SWFs have combined assets of more than $800 billion, Russia’s
“National Welfare Fund,” “Reserve Fund,” and “Russian Direct Investment Fund” have
combined assets of more than $185 billion, and Algeria’s “Revenue Regulation Fund”
has assets of more than $75 billion (SWF, 2013). Governments direct their SWFs to
channel financial capital into international investments that directly or indirectly help
NOCs acquire petroleum resources across the world. The presence and influence of

SWFs in the acquisition of petroleum resources possibly highlights the aspiration among
some countries to increase their geopolitical position and power.
The dominance of Chinese NOCs
Both China and Russia have substantial amounts of petroleum resources within their
borders. However, unlike Russia, China is a net importer. This is because, as illustrated
by the energy use and GDP numbers in Figure 3, the demand for resources within
China is very high and the resources within China’s borders are not sufficient. China is
projected to increase its demand for natural gas alone by over 300% over the next 20
years (Karev, 2013). For Chinese NOCs, investing abroad is not just about securing the
future in terms of geopolitical position and power – it is also about satisfying demand.
We see this sentiment reflected in the headlines related to Sinopec, a Chinese NOC,
that spent over $17 billion in the 9 months from March to December 2010: “Sinopec
acquires interest in Angola Block 18 from parent for $2.5B” (28 March), “ConocoPhillips
sells interest in Syncrude Project to Sinopec for $4.65B” (12 April), “Hupecol sells
interests in four Llanos Basin blocks to Sinopec for $281M” (18 August), “Sinopec
acquires 40% interest in Repsol’s Brazilian business for $7.1B” (1 October), “Sinopec
acquires 18% interest in Gendalo-Gehem project from Chevron for $680M” (2
December), and “Sinopec acquires Argentina unit of Oxy for $2.5B” (10 December) (DP,
2012; PLS, 2012). Our data suggest that Chinese NOCs acquire resources wherever
possible: Angola, Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Libya, Nigeria, Russia, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, and USA. If SOEs and NSOEs from other countries decide
to compete for resources with similar vigor, the result could be intense bidding wars for
resources across the world.
Limitations and Future Research
We acknowledge the limitations of our study. First, because we focus on state
ownership, it is outside the scope of this study to examine the competition among
NSOEs. Future research not specifically focused on SOEs could use resource security
theory to investigate competition among NSOEs. Second, future research could
examine differences between ownership and control (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014).
Although we focus on ownership in this study, comparing ownership and control could
provide more insight into the arguments made in this study. Third, this study utilized the
exploration vs exploitation framework. Future research can extend resource security
theory to examine alternative frameworks and settings, such as those on corporate
social responsibility, sustainability of resource usage (Chakrabarty & Wang, 2012,
2013), and resource scarcity in institutional voids (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2013b, 2014,
forthcoming). Finally, we acknowledge some countries may be less inviting for SOEs
than others. The role of government not as an owner, but as an approving mechanism
that foreign acquirers have to face, can be an avenue for future research.
Concluding remarks

This study developed a theory of resource security and used it to examine the influence
of state ownership on resource acquisition decisions by firms investing abroad. For
SOEs, resource security implies having sufficient resources as a safeguard for the
future. By acquiring resources with a long-term perspective, SOEs can secure the
country’s future not only by reducing dependence on foreign entities but also by
increasing geopolitical position and power of the Country.
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